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Brickley: McClain Untarnished: The NSPA Shines Through the Phiale Controver

CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
MCCLAIN UNTARNISHED: THE NSPA SHINES
THROUGH THE PHIALE CONTROVERSY
Never forget where you came from, or you will lose sight of who
you are.
-Cyril J. Dolan
INTRODUCTION

Consider for a moment a world without cultural history.
Imagine an environment where little is known about the past.
Cultures would have come and gone, with the present generation
oblivious to prior existence. Each and every child born is
scrutinized from day one; does she look like her father or her
mother? Who in her family has those eyes? This is only the
beginning, at seven she is unable to walk ten yards without falling,
"ah, she's clumsy, just like her grandmother." At fourteen she
buries herself in books, and is constantly analyzing the world
around her, "she's intense, just like her father." And so it goes, a
lifetime of comparisons, some to people who she has never had the
opportunity to meet. History repeats itself, as the saying goes.
Because of the cyclical nature of life, history facilitates
understanding our place in the human timeline. Cultural property
is one teacher that helps us comprehend this lesson, and in order to
facilitate the learning process, many countries have developed
rules to protect the cultural property found within their borders.
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, Known as a Gold
PhialeMesomphalos, C. 400 B.C. ("the Steinhardt case") is one of
many stolen property cases raising international concern and
salient questions about United States policy as it relates to foreign
1. 991 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y.); 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999) [hereinafter An
Antique Platterof Gold].
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016315
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cultural property. 2 The National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA")
has been the focus of this debate for over twenty years, beginning
with United States v. McClain,3 which established the United
States' recognition of other nations' cultural property laws.4 This
Note addresses the current state of foreign cultural property laws in
light of the NSPA and the recently decided An Antique Platter of
5
Gold.
In An Antique Platter of Gold, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit approved the seizure of an antique
platter, better known as the Phiale, under a Customs forfeiture
statute but withheld judgment on the validity of Italian patrimony
law.6 The court also addressed the relevance of the McClain
doctrine and the NSPA, effectively upholding the doctrine and the
associated law, thus providing a concrete framework under which
foreign patrimony claims are to be adjudicated.7
In this Note, questions of the following nature will be addressed.
When a foreign nation has a cultural property law, what is the
United States' responsibility to adhere to that law, and to whom is
2. Id.
3. 545 F.2d 988 (5"' Cir. 1977) [hereinafter McClain 1]; 593 F.2d 658 (5'
Cir. 1979) (hereinafter McClain 11).
4. Id. Synonyms for cultural property include the terms "cultural patrimony"
(national patrimony), "cultural heritage" and "antiquities." All of these words
can be used interchangeably, however, the term cultural patrimony is often
applied to objects that are of such significance that they form an integral part of
the cultural heritage and identity of a particular cultural group. Karen J. Warren,
A PhilosophicalPerspective on the Ethics and Resolution of CulturalProperties

Issues, in

ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE CULTURE?

WHOSE PROPERTY? 8 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed.) (quoted in Jason C.

Roberts, The Protection of Indigenous Populations' CulturalProperty in Peru,
Mexico, and the UnitedStates, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INTL.L. 327, 355 (1997)).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1999) ("NSPA"). The NSPA provides, in pertinent
part: "Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign
commerce, any goods, [etc.].. .of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing the
same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud [shall be guilty of a
crime]." Id.

6. The Customs statute is 19 U.S.C. § 545 (1999); its application in An
Antique Platterof Gold is thoroughly discussed in Section II of this Note. See
infra notes 91-193 and accompanying text.

7. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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any responsibility owed? Is the current owner of such property a
legitimate owner, and if so, does it matter if the owner was aware
of the true origin of the property? Which statute do courts apply to
justify United States involvement in the seizure of stolen cultural
property? What materiality standard should be applied under the
Customs statute, and furthermore, how does it relate to foreign
cultural property, McClain, and the NSPA? The latter question
became the crux of the Second Circuit decision in An Antique
Platter of Gold, and in responding to that question the court
provided direction regarding all of the aforementioned issues.
Section I of this Note details the cases leading up to An Antique
Platter of Gold, outlining the heavy, but fair, burdens imposed by
the NSPA.' Section II dissects both the district court and Second
Circuit decisions of An Antique Platter of Gold.9 Section III
discusses the fact that not only did the Second Circuit uphold the
NSPA, but the court also reaffirmed the importance of honoring
the cultural patrimony laws of other nations via the most applicable
United States statute." Section IV discusses the future of the
NSPA in light of yet another case affirming McClain." Section V
concludes that it is important to honor cultural property in United
States courts.

I. BACKGROUND

In order to fully understand the Steinhardt case, one must first
understand a line of cases beginning with United States v.
Hollinshead" and shortly followed by McClain, 3 which
established the United States' recognition of foreign patrimony
laws under the NSPA. 14 The basic premise of these decisions is
8. See infra notes 12-89 and accompanying text.
9. See inftra notes 90-192 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 193-229 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 230-237 and accompanying text.
12. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d. 988 (1977), 593 F.2d 658 (1979).
18 U.S.C.
§ 2314.
Published by14.
Digital
Commons@DePaul,
2016
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that the United States will honor another nation's declaration of
ownership over cultural property provided that the nation has
established a clear law or declaration prior to an object's removal
from that country.
A. United States v. Hollinshead
In Hollinshead,the defendants were prosecuted under the NSPA
for conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate commerce
and for being the cause of the transport of stolen property in
interstate commerce.15 The court action arose when pre-Columbian
artifacts, including one object known as Machaquila Stele 2, were
found in a Mayan ruin in the jungle of Guatemala. The Stele had
been cut into pieces, taken to Belize, packed, and sent to
Hollinshead's residence in California. 6
Defendants were
convicted for conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate
commerce and for causing the transportation of property in
interstate commerce in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, and appealed.' 7 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit found eight of the defendants' claims, all related to
sufficiency of evidence, to be without merit. 8 However, the court
entertained the defendants' ninth claim alleging that the lower
court gave the jury an overbroad legal instruction. 9
The Ninth Circuit determined that the trial judge failed to
instruct the jury to determine whether the defendants had
knowledge of Guatemalan law.2 ' The court determined that
although the trial judge's jury instruction was erroneous, the
judgment could be upheld because the trial judge instructed the
jury to determine whether the defendants' knew the Stele had been

15. See 495 F.2d at 1155.
16. See id.

17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. Defendants challenged the instruction on the grounds that the
court failed to make clear to the jury that there is no presumption that
individuals have knowledge of foreign law.

20. See id. at 1156

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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stolen.' In reaching the conclusion, the court held that a defendant
does not have to know from where an object was stolen or the law
of the object's place of origin; rather, a defendant need only realize
that the object was stolen.2 Based on the evidence presented at
trial, such as the fact that the defendants were present in Belize
when Guatemalan officers were bribed and the packages were
shipped to the United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the
convictions were valid and affirmed the district court's decision.23
In 1977, the Fifth Circuit first considered, whether Mexican law
established national ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts in
United States v. MCClain.24 The first appeal dealt with the trial
court's jury instruction that Mexico asserted ownership of cultural
property in 1897Y.2 The McClain and Hollinshead cases were the
first in a line of cases brought against individuals for their
violations of foreign cultural property laws and subsequent import
into the United States. The McClain case cuts to the heart of many
issues involved in the national cultural property/common human
culture debate.26
B. United States v. McClain
1. The Facts
In McClain, a group of five conspirators were held criminally
liable for stealing pre-Columbian artifacts from Mexico and selling
them in the United States. 7 The defendants were charged with
conspiring to receive, conceal and/or steal goods in interstate
21. See Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155-56. The trial judge's instruction that
"every person knows what the law forbids" may have been erroneous, but was
not so overbroad as to constitute prejudicial error because the judge clearly
instructed the jury to determine whether defendants knew the stele was stolen.
See id. at 1155.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988 (5t' Cir. 1977).

25. Id. at 994.
26. See Lynn S. Waterman, Was the Stela "Stolen"?, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 515, 516 (1992).
See Commons@DePaul,
McClain I, 545 F.2d 2016
at 992.
Published by27.
Digital
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commerce and for having received, concealed, and/or sold stolen
goods in interstate or foreign commerce in violation of the NSPA.28
Defendant ringleader Joseph Rodriguez had "squads" unearthing
29
artifacts in Mexico at a number of different archaeological sites.
Rodriguez and his counterparts passed these objects into the United
States and attempted to sell them.
In the course of the
investigation, FBI agents learned that each defendant was aware
that his or her activities were illegal. In fact, one defendant
described the operation to an undercover agent as a "conduit." The
items were taken from their original sites to an archaeological
institute in Mexico where they would obtain documents with either
forged or backdated information.30 Another commented that the
objects were stolen by "Indians" who were paid very little and did
not know the true value of these objects. 1 The objects were to be
sold to anyone who would take them. Often, the goal of the
defendants was to fly the objects to Europe in order to "auction"
them off, giving the appearance that the objects came to the United
States from European art dealers. The trip to Europe allowed the
defendants to provide the dealers
with artificial bills of sale, thus
32
importation.
the
"legitimizing"
2. McClain I
At the first trial, the judge instructed the jury that Mexican law
provided for Mexican ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts since
1897 unless Mexico licensed or otherwise permitted "private
persons or parties or others to receive and export in their
possession such artifacts to other places or other countries. '3 3 The
Fifth Circuit held that the jury instructions were erroneous because,
28. See id.
29. McClain II at 660, n. 2. Rodriguez was dismissed as a defendant due to
incompetence prior to the second Fifth Circuit decision.

30. See id. at 663.
31. See id. One defendant told an undercover agent that the individuals
stealing the artifacts "had no idea of their worth and were paid only a small sum
to get the artifacts from the diggings." Id.

32. See id. at 660.
33. McClain I, 545 F.2d 988, 994 (

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/65
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first, the jury was instructed that Mexican law established
ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts in 1897 and then asked the
jury to decide whether the defendants were guilty of knowingly
transporting stolen property. 4 According to the Fifth Circuit, such
an instruction was "highly prejudicial" in the jury's determination
that defendants had knowledge that the property was stolen
because such a "legislative fiat" was not enacted in Mexico until
1972 rather than 1897.3"
The court explained that, prior to 1972, Mexican law pertained
primarily to export restrictions, which, unlike explicit declarations
of ownership, do not invoke the NSPA.36 The court analogized
Mexican export restrictions to the police power in the United
States. 7 Any property within Mexico's borders may be subject to
government control for any number of reasons.
However,
controlling an object's movement in and out of Mexico did not
establish ownership, so the export restrictions were merely
regulatory in nature. 8 Thus, until 1972, pre-Columbian objects
were subject to Mexican export regulation, but they were not
property of the Mexican government.3 The issue to be considered
then became whether the objects could be deemed stolen under the
NSPA.4 °
The court articulated the Congressional purpose in enacting the
NSPA as an effort to discourage the taking and receiving of stolen
goods.4 ' The court then discussed the definition of "stolen" under
the NSPA. The court adopted a broad interpretation of stolen, and
also held that the NSPA was not an appropriate action when
property was illegally exported. The court determined that the
34. See id.
35. McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1000.

36. Id. The United States has never authorized seizure of property merely
because the act of exporting the object from another nation violated that nation's
export laws. In contrast, taking property that is subject to a foreign country's
patrimony law is considered a theft, and is subject to seizure under the NSPA
because of that theft.
37. See id. at 1002.
38. See id.
39. See McClain I, 545 F.2d at 1003.
40. See id. at 988.
See Commons@DePaul,
id. at 994.
Published by41.
Digital
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NSPA applies only if a country has also declared ownership." The
court explained that the term stealing is commonly understood to
apply to "any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains
that which rightfully belongs to another and deprives the owner of
'
the rights and benefits of ownership."43
Yet, in keeping with its
broad definition of stolen, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that a
country can be an owner without ever actually possessing the
property.'
The court explained that the NSPA applies to "art
objects or artifacts declared to be the property of another country
and illegally imported into this country."45 Thus, McClain I
established that the NSPA may apply when property is removed
without permission from a foreign nation when that nation has
established a patrimony law.
The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, and the
jury was directed to determine when the pre-Columbian artifacts
had been taken from Mexico and whether this exportation violated
Mexican law.46 According to McClain I, the critical question was
whether the artifacts were taken prior to Mexico's 1972
declaration.47 If not, the artifacts would be considered illegally
exported, but the activity would not rise to the level of "theft"
under the NSPA.48 The case went back to trial, and the defendants
were again found guilty on both the NSPA and the criminal
conspiracy charges.49
3. McClain II
In response to the petition for rehearing after McClain I, the
Fifth Circuit instructed the district court to admit testimony on the
42. See id. at 1003 n.33.
43. Id. at 995.
44. See id. at 996.
45. McClainI, 545 F.2d at 997.
46. See id. at 1003.
47. See id. "In order to say whether any of the pre-Columbian movable
artifacts were 'stolen,' it is necessary to know first when that artifact was
exported from Mexico." Id. at 1003.
48. See id. at 669, 672.
49. See McClain II, 593 F.2d 658.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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meaning of Mexican legislative enactments at the second trial,
despite the first panel's determination that Mexico did not have an
ownership law until 1972.0 At the district court level, the judge
followed the Fifth Circuit's direction and allowed witnesses to
testify regarding Mexican cultural patrimony laws. Although they
were unable to cite specific language in Mexico's 1897, 1920,
1930, or 1934 legislation that would establish ownership of the
types of pre-Columbian artifacts at issue in the case, witnesses
were adamant that Mexico did have ownership rights over such
objects prior to 1972.1 Thus, on remand the trial judge was again
left to instruct the jury regarding Mexican law, this time with the
added discrepancy between the Fifth Circuit's discussion of
Mexican law and the witnesses' view of the law. Using his best
judgment, the judge instructed the jury to determine whether
Mexico had an ownership law when the artifacts were taken from
Mexico. 2 The defendants were convicted a second time, and again
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
On appeal, the defendants challenged: (1) the application of the
NSPA to pre-Columbian artifacts; (2) the accuracy of the jury
instructions with respect to Mexican law; and (3) the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the convictions under the jury's
determination of Mexican law."
With respect to their first argument, the defendants alleged that
the NSPA was superseded by the 1972 Law on Importation of PreColumbian Monumental or Architectural Sculpture or Murals. 4
50. See id. at 667 (citing U.S. v. McClain, 551 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1977)).
51. See id. at 667-68, n 13.
52. See id. at 668-69.
53. See id. at 660.
54. See id. at 663-64; see also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095 (1999). This 1972
Act prohibits the importation of pre-Columbian monumental or architectural
sculpture or murals into the United States from countries that have outlawed
their exportation. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-2095. For further discussion of this
Act, see Aaron M. Boyce, A Proposalto Combat the Illegal Trafficking of PreColumbian Artifacts, 3 HISPANIc L.J. 91, 105 (1997); Paige Margules,
InternationalArt Theft and Illegal Import and Export of Cultural Property: A
Study of Relevant Values, Legislation and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 609, 628-31 (1992); Oliver Metzger, Making the Doctrine of Res Extra
Commercium
Visible in U.S. Law,
Published by
Digital Commons@DePaul,
201674 TEX. L. REV. 615, 619 (1996); Leslie S.
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Under the doctrine of law of the case, the Fifth Circuit summarily
rejected this challenge, refusing to consider an argument that was
not presented initially." The McClain II panel explained that the
NSPA is a valid claim, agreeing with the McClain I panel that the
NSPA protects "ownership derived from foreign legislative
pronouncements," in addition to common law ownership rights.56
Furthermore, the McClain II panel found that defendants had no
grounds upon which to raise this argument as they presented no
new evidence on the issue, no court decision or legislation had
changed the ruling, and because the first panel's decision was
neither erroneous nor manifestly unjust.57
The defendants further argued that criminal penalties imposed on
the basis of violation of Mexican laws contravened due process
because the Mexican laws were "vague and inaccessible except to
a handful of experts who work for the Mexican government."58
After assessing the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the trial
court's decision on remand, the Fifth Circuit held that while early
Mexican laws regarding pre-Columbian artifacts were indeed
confusing and even misleading, the 1972 statute "is clear and
unequivocal in claiming ownership of all artifacts .... We agree
with the earlier panel that it is proper to punish through the
National Stolen Property Act encroachments upon legitimate and
clear Mexican ownership, even though the goods may never have
been physically possessed by agents of that nation." 9
In determining the accuracy of the jury instructions regarding
Mexican law, the Fifth Circuit held that asking the jury to decide
whether and when the Mexican patrimony law took effect was
The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed defendants'
erroneous.
Potter, & Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common CulturalHeritage: The Need for a
Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return of Stolen Cultural
Property,5 TRANSNAT'L LAW 627, 634 (1992); Roberts, supra note 4 at 355-56.
55. See McClain II, 593 F.2d at 664. If the defendants had raised this
challenge prior to the initial trial, the assertion would not have succeeded, as
most of the artifacts the defendants took from Mexico did not fall within the
limits of the statute. See id. at 664 n.5.
56. See id. at 664.
57. See id. at 664-65.
58. Id. at 663-64.
59. Id. at 670-71.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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substantive charge of having received, concealed, and/or stolen
goods placed in foreign commerce.6" The Fifth Circuit held that
the trial court misinterpreted the question of whether it is for the
judge or jury to decide the terms of Mexican law, explaining that
the judge should decide questions of foreign law.61 However, even
if the lower court's error in presenting the question of Mexican law
was harmless, in this instance the defendants' substantive count
would still be overturned because the "most likely jury
construction of Mexican law upon the evidence at trial is that
Mexico declared itself owner of all artifacts at least as early as
1897. "62 Given the first panel's determination that all of Mexico's
cultural property laws prior to 1972 were export controls rather
than ownership laws, such an instruction is problematic. Thus, the
second panel held that the pre-1972 laws were too vague to impose
63
criminal liability.
The court did, however, allow the conspiracy charge under the
NSPA to stand as the defendant's willful conduct provided
6
evidence of their knowledge of the existence of a patrimony law.
The Fifth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's determination
that the 1972 Mexican law constituted a sufficient declaration of
ownership to invoke the NSPA, stating, "[t]he evidence is massive
that appellants knew and deliberately ignored Mexico's post-1972
ownership claims. ' 65 Based on this, the court affirmed the
defendants' convictions on the conspiracy charge, concluding that
the defendants' were guilty of continuous illegal activity in the
trade of known stolen objects. 6

60. See McClain 1I,
593 F.2d at 667-69.
61. See id. at 669.
62. Id. at 670. Here, the court is referring to the 1897 Mexican law, "Ley
Sobre Monumentos Arquelogicos, Diario Oficial de Mayo de 1897." Id.
63. See id. at 671.
64. See id. at 671-72.
65. Id. at 671.
See Commons@DePaul,
McClain II, 593 F.2d2016
at 672.
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C. The McClain Progeny
1. Government ofPeru v. Johnson
Subsequent to the McClain decisions, many courts have also
held that the United States will honor another country's patrimony
laws. While many of these decisions have recognized foreign
patrimony laws during a preliminary motion, the courts
acknowledge the presence of legislation and/or precedent when
considering the issues involved. For example, in Government of
Peru v. Johnson, the Government of Peru brought an action in the
United States alleging that eighty-nine pre-Columbian artifacts
seized from Benjamin Johnson were the property of Peru. 67 After
acknowledging that Peru is entitled to United States legal support
in preventing and rectifying conduct "destructive of a major
segment of the cultural heritage of Peru," the district court held
that the evidence presented was not sufficient to overcome the
heavy legal and factual burdens required in national patrimony
cases.68 The court explained that there was sufficient evidence that
Johnson's purchases were made in good faith, such as
documentation showing that the objects were legitimately
purchased.69 The court further determined that Peru did not meet
its burden with respect to where or when the property was taken or
in establishing the clarity of Peru's patrimony laws.7"
First, the court explained that Peru's principal witness, Dr.
Francisco Iriarte, an archaeologist in Pre-Columbian artifacts, was
not able to identify exactly where the artifacts originated. Iriarte's
testimony established that Pre-Columbian culture spread beyond
the boundaries of modem-day Peru into modem-day Bolivia and
Ecuador.71 The Court reasoned that the artifacts in question, while
similar to those found in modem-day Peruvian excavation sites,
could also be found in other archaeological monuments in
67. 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
68. Id. at 812.
69. See id. at 814.
70. See id. at 810.
71. See id. at 812.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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adjoining countries.72 Because Iriarte could not definitively
identify Peru as the country of origin for the objects, the court was
prevented from holding that they did in fact come from Peru.73
Second, the district court considered whether Peru had a cultural
property law in effect at the time the objects were taken. The court
examined various Peruvian laws and found that only one,
established in 1985, provided Peru with ownership of Pre-Hispanic
artistic objects.74 The district court then rejected Peru's contention
that Johnson received any objects after 1985, stating that even if
Johnson had, the court was not "satisfied that Mr. Johnson received
any of the items ... with the knowledge that they were illegally
removed from Peru. 75
Third, the court acknowledged that Peru does have a long history
of preserving its historic interest in artistic objects, but argued that
declarations asserting such interest have been limited and often
ignored. 76 The court likened Peru's laws to those of pre-1972
Mexico, stating "the laws of Peru concerning its artifacts could
reasonably be considered to have no more effect than export
77
restrictions. . .'they do not create 'ownership' in the state."'
Relying on McClain II, the Court further declared Peruvian law
unclear and agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning that a
patrimony law must be understandable to Americans. 7
Thus, Johnson established clear elements which must be met in
order to establish a claim for theft under the NSPA. In addition to
establishing a cultural property ownership law, a foreign nation
must show: (1) the object was taken from the modem-day
boundaries of the country; (2) the object was taken after the
effective date of a national ownership law; and (3) the law stating
national ownership is sufficiently clear to an American citizen.79

72. See id.
73. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 812.
74. See id. at 813-14.
75. Id. at 814.
76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting McClain 1, 545 F.2d 988, 1002 (5' Cir. 1977)).
78. Id. at 814-15.
Johnson,
720 F. Supp. at 2016
811-14.
Published by79.
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2. Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners
In Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners," the Republic of Turkey
brought an action demanding the return of the Elmali Hoard, a
collection of approximately two thousand ancient Greek and
Lycian coins.8" The court determined that Turkey's antiquities laws
sufficiently establish ownership of ancient artifacts, satisfying the
clarity requirement set forth in Johnson.82 The issue at trial then
became whether the coins were actually taken from present-day
Turkey subsequent to Turkey's national patrimony law.83 While
the reported decision deals with rules of discovery, the case
exemplifies the strict evidentiary standards a country must meet
when seeking to recover an article of cultural significance from the
United States. In order to obtain relief under the NSPA, a country
must establish all three elements-any one alone will not result in a
return of the property based on the NSPA.
3. Republic of Croatia v. The Trustee of the Marquess of
Northampton 1987 Settlement
Similarly, in Republic of Croatiav. The Trustee of the Marquess
of Northampton 1987 Settlement,84 the court held that regardless of
Croatian patrimony law, Croatia failed to prove that the treasure
was discovered within the country's borders.8" In a case initially
brought and subsequently dropped by Lebanon, neither Croatia nor
Hungary was able to convince a jury that Roman silver believed to
once have been owned by Roman General Sevso, was removed
from their territory.86
80. 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 1 (D. Mass. 1993).
81. See id.
82. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
83. See id. at 3.
84. 610 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1st Dept. 1994).
85. See id.
86. See Republic of Croatia v. the Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton
1987 Settlement, 203 A.D. 2d 167 610 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1St Dept. 1994). At one
point, Lebanon, Croatia, and Hungary all asserted ownership of the silver. See
also Republic of Lebanon v. Sotheby's, 561 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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4. United States v. Pre-ColumbianArtifacts and the Republic of
Guatemala
Another case explicitly upholding the McClain interpretation of
the NSPA is United States v. Pre-Columbian Artifacts and the
Republic of Guatemala." In this case, the government filed an
interpleader action to determine who was entitled to preColumbian artifacts seized from defendants.
In response,
defendants moved to strike Guatemala's claim of possession of the
artifacts. The court denied the motion assuming for the purposes
of the motion that Guatemalan law sufficiently established
ownership upon illegal export of pre-Colombian artifacts.88 The
court adhered to MeClain !'s broad interpretation of "stolen" under
the NSPA and agreed with McClain II's holding that a foreign
declaration of ownership establishes ownership even when that
government may never have actually possessed the object.89
These cases not only provide support for the McClain doctrine
(that cultural property taken from a country with clear national
patrimony laws will be respected in the United States), they also
illustrate the difficulties a country must overcome in order to
establish such a claim.

1990). Lebanon later withdrew its claim because Lebanon's evidence was
discredited in the press. For further discussion on the Lebanon v. Sotheby's
case, see Lawrence M. Kaye, The Recovery of Stolen Cultural Property: A
Practitioner'sView - War Stories and Morality Tales, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 5, 13 (1998).
87. 845 F. Supp. 544 (1993).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 546-47.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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SUBJECT OPINION:

UNITED STATES V. AN ANTIQUE PLATTER OF GOLD

A. The Facts
Like many cases involving cultural property, the location of the
Phiale was unaccounted for from its creation until 1980 when a
private antique collector in Sicily decided to find out whether the
Phiale was authentic. The collector, Vincenzo Pappalardo, went to
Dr. Giacomo Manganaro, professor of Greek history and
Numismatics, in search of the origins of the Phiale. Manganaro
was able to determine, based upon an inscription along the edge of
the Phiale, that the Phaile was indeed authentic and of Sicilian
origin.
Manganaro found that the inscription was written in a
Greek Doric dialect, spoken in ancient Greek-Sicilian colonies.9"
Later that year, Pappalardo traded the Phiale to Vincenzo
Cammarata, a Sicilian coin dealer and art collector, forworks of art
valued at approximately $20,000.92
Apparently, the Phiale
remained with Cammarata until 1991 when he showed it to Silvana
Verga and Enzo Brai, telling them the Phiale was found near
Caltavuturo, Sicily, where an Italian utility company was
working.93 Cammarata gave a photograph of the Phiale to a
personal friend and art dealer specializing in antiquities. The
dealer, William Veres, owned an art dealership by the name of
Stedron in Zurich, Switzerland.94
Cammarata and Veres
exchanged the Phiale for approximately $90,000 worth of other
95
artifacts.
Veres then contacted Robert Haber, owner of Robert Haber &
Company Ancient Art in New York City. In November of 1991,
90.

U.S. v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F Supp. 222, 224 (S.D.N.Y

1997).

91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 224-25.
95. See id. at 225.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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Haber met Veres in Sicily where he viewed the Phiale in person.96
Based on this meeting, Haber became more interested in the
Phiale, particularly on behalf of one of his clients, Michael
The two had a rather extensive dealer-client
Steinhardt.
relationship, Haber having sold Steinhardt over twenty objects in
the past with sales totaling $4-6 million.97 Haber informed
Steinhardt that the Phiale was the twin of a platter that belongs to
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City.98 Haber
further informed Steinhardt that he purchased the Phiale from a
Sicilian coin dealer. 99
Steinhardt agreed to buy the Phiale, using Haber as an
intermediary.'
Steinhardt agreed to pay $1 million for the Phiale
in two separate installments, and an additional 15% commission to
Haber.' 0 ' As a condition of the sale, Haber drafted a document
entitled "Terms of Sale" which provided: "If the object is
confiscated or impounded by customs agents or a claim is made by
any country or governmental agency whatsoever, full
compensation will be made immediately to the purchaser....

A

letter is to be written by Dr.
Manganaro that he saw the object 15
2

years ago in Switz.[sic]'

10

Steinhardt wired the first money transfer from his New York
account to Veres' account in Stedron 3 Four days later, Haber
flew from New York to Zurich, then traveled to Lugano,
Switzerland along the Italian-Switzerland border to meet Veres. 4
Haber took possession of the Phiale on December 12, 1991, and
the transfer was confirmed on a commercial invoice signed by
Veres"' On December 13, 1991, Haber sent a fax to his customs
96. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 225.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 225 (quoting Terms of Sale
for the Phiale, Government Exhibit 5).
103. See id. at 225.
104. See id. at 225-26.
SeeCommons@DePaul,
id. at 226.
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broker, Jet Air Services, Inc., at J.F.K. International Airport." 6 Jet
Air Service, Inc. -prepared an Entry Form and Immediate Delivery
Form to obtain the release of the Phiale by a Customs inspection." 7
On this form, the Phiale's country of origin was listed as
Switzerland." 8 Haber's broker also completed an Entry Summary
form where he stated the value of the Phiale at $250,000.109 The
broker again listed the country of origin as Switzerland." 0 On
December 15, 1991, Haber entered the United States with the
Phiale via Geneva, Switzerland."' On January 6, 1992, either
Haber or Steinhardt went to the Metropolitan Museum of Art to
The Museum acknowledged the
determine its authenticity."'
Steinhardt then paid the second
Phiale's authenticity."'
installment to Veres' Stedron account on January 29, 1992, and
paid Haber the $162,364 commission. 114
On February 16, 1995, the Italian Government submitted a
Letters Rogatory Request to the United States pursuant to the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters." 5 Italy
wanted the Phiale back. 1 6 On November 9, 1995, the United
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 226.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Seeid.
112. See id.
113. Seeid.
114. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 226.
115. See id. at 226-27. See also Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, November 9, 1982, US-Italy, 24 I.L.M. 1539 (1985). Under
the Letters Rogatory Request, Italy asked the United States to assist them in
determining the circumstances of the Phiale's export from Italy. See
Respondent's Brief at 7, US. v. An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d
Cir. 1999). Italy also requested that the Phiale be confiscated and returned to
Italy. See id. Italy asserted that the Phiale was removed from an excavation site
in Italy, and through private hands was transferred to Haber. See id. The
request further informed the United States that the export violated Articles 35,
36, 66, and 67 of Italy's law of June 1, 1939, No. 1089 (illegal export and
possession of antiquities) and Article 648 of the Italian penal code (receiving
stolen property). See id.
116. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 226-27.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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States Customs Service seized the Phiale from Steinhardt's home
pursuant to a warrant.1 7 On December 13, 1995, the United States
government filed a civil forfeiture action under 18 U.S.C. § 545
and 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a)(c), alleging the Phiale had been illegally
imported into the United States based on materially false
statements regarding the Phiale's country of origin."'
B. The Decisions
In the Southern District of New York, both the United States and
Steinhardt sought summary judgment. 9 The court granted
summary judgment to the United States, finding that the statement
on the Customs form claiming Switzerland as the country of origin
was false and material and that 18 U.S.C. § 545 does not provide
for an innocent owner defense. 2 ° The court also held that the
Phiale was stolen under the meaning of the NSPA, the importer
knew the Phiale was stolen, and forfeiture of the platter did not
12
violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. '
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision, agreeing
that the false designation on the Customs form was a material false

117. See id. at 227.
118. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 545 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United
States any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys,

sells, or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or
sale of such merchandise after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported into the United States contrary to law [shall be guilty of
a crime]. . . . Merchandise introduced into the United States in
violation of this Section... shall be forfeited to the United States. 18
U.S.C. § 545 (1999). 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) provides, in relevant part:

Merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the
United States contrary to law shall be... seized and forfeited if it... is
stolen, smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced...

19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) (1999).
119. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 224; An Antique Platter
of Gold, 184 F.3d at 133.

120. See id.
See Commons@DePaul,
id.
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statement.'22 The Second Circuit also agreed that no innocent
owner defense exists under 18 U.S.C. § 545, and there was no
excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.2 2 The Second
Circuit, however, did not address the implications of the NSPA as
a separate issue.1'2 Rather, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
the importance of truthfulness
the existence of the NSPA supported
25
Customs.
to
statements
making
in
1. Materiality
The district court held that importing the Phiale violated 18
U.S.C. § 545 which prohibits the importing of merchandise
"contrary to law.' 26 Further, 18 U.S.C. § 545 allows the
government to forfeit merchandise that has been determined
imported contrary to law.' 27 The district court found that the
importation of the Phiale was "contrary to law" because naming
Switzerland as the Phiale's country of origin, and lying about the
value of the Phiale, were false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 542.128
Section 542 of title 18 U.S.C. prohibits importing merchandise
by means of a false statement, and allows for seizure of the object
122. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 132 (2d Cir. 1999).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 545.
127. See id.
128. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 226, 230. Section 542
provides in relevant part:
Whoever enters or introduces.. .into the commerce of the United States
any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by means of any false statement,
written or verbal... or makes any false statement in any declaration
without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement, or
procures the making of any such false statement as to any matter
material thereto without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such
statement [shall be guilty of a crime].... Nothing in this Section shall
be construed to relieve imported merchandise from forfeiture under
other provisions of law.
18
U.S.C.
§ 542 (1999) (emphasis added).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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via 18 U.S.C. § 545.129 Thus, a false statement in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 542 constitutes an act "contrary to law," and that act
therefore triggers 18 U.S.C. § 545. Customs then has authority to
forfeit the illicit merchandise. In order to find that the Phiale was
subject to forfeiture, the district court had to first determine the
scope of materiality.
While United States' courts are in agreement that a false
statement must be material to violate 18 U.S.C. § 542, the courts
are split regarding what constitutes a material misstatement. 130 The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have opted to apply a but-for standard,
where misstatements on Customs forms are considered material
only if but for those statements the merchandise would not have
been permitted into the country.13 1 In contrast, the First Circuit
applies what is known as the "natural tendency test,"' 32 giving a
broader meaning to materiality.'33 Under this broad definition, a
statement is material either if in making the statement the importer
hoped to introduce goods that would otherwise not be admitted, or,
if the misstatement affected or facilitated the importation of
incoming merchandise.' 34 Under the natural tendency test, a trial
court is asked to determine "whether the false statement had a
natural tendency to influence the actions or decisions of the
Customs Service."' 35
While acknowledging the split, the district court adopted the
First Circuit's "natural tendency test.', 136 The district court
explained that the language "by means of' in the statute should be
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 542 (1999).
130. See An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 229-30; see also
United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 157 (lst Cir. 1994); United States v.
Bagnall, 907 F.2d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Teraoka, 669 F.2d

577, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
131. An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 229. For further review of
the but for test, see Teraoka, 669 F.2d 577; United States v. Corcuera-Valor,
910 F.2d 198, 199-200 (5th Cir. 1990).

132. An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 229. For further review of
the natural tendency test, see Holmquist, 36 F.3d at 158-61.
133. See Holnquist, 36 F.3d at 158-61.
134. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F.Supp. at 229.

135. Id. at 229-30.
Id. Commons@DePaul,
at 229-31.
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read to mean that a false statement has been made at a significant
stage in the importation process. 137 The statute should not be
interpreted to mean that without the false statement importation
could not have occurred.'38 The district court further noted that
courts in other jurisdictions have applied the natural tendency
standard in cases dealing with other false statement issues. 39 For
this reason, the court considered whether the false statement had a
natural tendency "to influence the actions or decisions of the
Customs Service."'40 Applying that standard, the court held that
the statements made by Haber's Customs broker, which were
presented to Customs at the moment of import, were materially
false because the Phiale's country of origin was clearly Italy, yet
the form indicated Switzerland.' 4 '
In further agreement with the First Circuit, the district court
found that a false statement is material "if it has the potential
significantly to affect the importation process as a whole."' 42 The
court reasoned that, in addition to following the language of 18
U.S.C. § 542, the natural tendency test is consistent with the
purpose of the statute, which is to ensure full disclosure in customs
statements and to maintain the integrity of importation. 43 The
court further explained that the natural tendency test is also
consistent in its application of the materiality standard as applied in
other false-statement instances.'"
The Customs Service considers country of origin for a number of
reasons, one of which is to determine whether an object is subject
to national ownership laws (i.e. Mexico's Act of 1972). Notably,
Italy has such a law while Switzerland does not. Had Haber named
the true country of origin, Customs inspectors would have been on
notice that an object of antiquity was being exported from a
country with specific antiquity-protection laws, and Customs
137. See id. at 229.
138. See id. at 229.
139. See id.
140. An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F.Supp. at 229-30.
141. See id. at 230.
142. Id. at 229 (citing Holmquist, 36 F.3d at 159).
143. See id. at 229.
144. See id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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would have investigated the description of the Phiale more
carefully.14 In this case, however, Customs was led to believe the
object came from Switzerland. Customs was unaware of a
potential NSPA violation because of the misstatement on the
Customs form.' 46
Following the reasoning of the district court and the
Government's urging, the Second Circuit agreed that the natural
tendency test is in line with the underlying goal of 18 U.S.C. §
47
542, to promote honesty in statements made during importation.
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's reasoning that
the ordinary meaning of the statute merely requires the false
statement be "integral" to the importation process rather than the
sole vehicle by which the object is imported.' The Second Circuit
further explained, based on Supreme Court reasoning, that the
common way to determine materiality is to determine whether a
false statement "has a natural tendency to influence or [is] capable
of influencing, the decisionmaking body to which it [is]
addressed."' 49 In developing a materiality test, the court cited
UnitedStates v. Holmquist.150 The Holmquist court stated, "a false
statement is material under 18 U.S.C. § 542 if it has the potential
significantly to affect the integrity or operation of the importation
process as a whole, and that neither actual causation nor harm to
the government need be demonstrated."''
The district court rejected the but for standard adopted by the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 5' The court explained that applying such
a rigid standard would discourage full disclosure in importation,
because the standard only acknowledges statements as material

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 230.
See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231.
See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 136.
See id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct.

1537 (1988)).
150. 36 F.3d 154 (1994).
151. Id. at 159.
An Commons@DePaul,
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when a true statement would entirely prevent importation.'53 "[B]y
preventing prosecution of many statements that unquestionably are
false and deleterious to the importation process, but nonetheless
cannot be proven to be the crucial factor in an object's admission
through Customs," the but for standard prevents the statutory goal
of full disclosure in importation from being met. 154
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court and rejected the
but for standard, as a but for test places too heavy a burden on the
government.
Under a but-for test, lying would be more
productive because the government would bear the
difficult burden of proving what would have
happened if a truthful statement had been made.
Moreover, under such a test, liability would not
attach for misstatements in cases where truthful
answers would still have enabled the goods to enter
the United States. Importers have incentives to lie
for reasons not related to achieving actual entry of
the goods - e.g., to reduce the duties payable or to
obtain expeditious customs treatment. . . . The
statutory purpose would thus be frustrated by the
narrow reading suggested by appellant.'55
Section 542 of 18 U.S.C. is a broad statute that covers any type
of imported merchandise. The but for test is inadequate to protect
foreign cultural property laws from importers whose sole purpose
is to mischievously introduce an object into this country in
circumvention of those laws. Furthermore, the but for test would
not stop importers who are seeking entry for objects in

153. See id. at 229 (stating that under the but for standard, "statements in the
Customs forms are not material unless the Government can show that but for
those statements the Phiale would not have been permitted to enter the country")
154. Id.
155. Id. at 136. Here, the Second Circuit refers to importers who make false
statements for purposes other than obtaining entry, such as reducing the duty
they will have to pay or to expedite the Customs process.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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contravention of trade agreements or safety standards.156 Both the
First and Second Circuits have explained that accepting the but for
test simply encourages importers to cry "immaterial!" when faced
with an 18 U.S.C. § 542 charge.5 7 The but for test does not
adequately emphasize the importance of honesty in Customs
forms, and as the Government successfully argued in this particular
case "country of origin goes to the heart of Customs enforcement
activity, and is the subject of routine inquiry by most Customs
officers." '58 Thus, Haber's misstatements on the Customs forms
were "far from 'trivial."' 159
2. The DistrictCourt and the NSPA
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld summary judgment based
primarily on the ground that the importation of the Phiale violated
18 U.S.C. § 545 and not on the basis of Italian law. 6 The court
justified its application of the 18 U.S.C. § 545 claim by finding
that the district court found summary judgment under either the 18
U.S.C. § 545 claim or the NSPA. 161 "We hold that the importation
of the Phiale violated 18 U.S.C. § 545 because of the false
statements on the Customs form. We need not, therefore, address
whether the NSPA incorporates concepts of property such as those
contained in the Italian patrimony law." 62 In this brief statement,
the Second Circuit seems to circumvent a major area of cultural
property law and disregard the arguments for and against holding
the Phiale "stolen" under the NSPA. Later in the decision,

156. See Holinquist, 36 F.3d 154 (1994) (convicting firearms importer for
understating the price of imported merchandise).
157. An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 136.
158. See Respondent's Brief at 23, U.S. v. An Antique Platterof Gold, 184
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).
159. Id.
160. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 134. The court also upheld
the district court's finding that the forfeiture was not excessive under the Eighth
Amendment. See id.
161. See id.
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however, the court cautiously explained that the NSPA is
applicable by virtue of Customs Directive No. 5230-15.163
Before discussing the Second Circuit's use of the NSPA to
strengthen the claim for forfeiture because of the material false
statement under 18 U.S.C. §545, it is important to understand the
lower court's interpretation of the NSPA. 16 At the district court
level, in order to further justify Customs' forfeiture of the Phiale,
the Government argued that the Phiale was subject to forfeiture
under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c) because it is stolen property imported
165
contrary to law, violative of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and the NSPA.
Under the NSPA, anyone who imports merchandise worth $5,000
or more with the knowledge that it is stolen is subject to criminal
sanction. 16 6 And, if merchandise is found to be in violation of the
NSPA, such merchandise is subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. §
1595a(c) which permits seizure of merchandise that is stolen or
introduced contrary to law.1 67 In its analysis, the district court
focused on whether the Government had probable cause to believe
that Haber, rather than Steinhardt, knew the Phiale was stolen at
1 68
the time of importation.
Under the NSPA and the McClain line of cases, if a foreign
sovereign has declared national ownership over its patrimony, the
United States will assist that country in retrieving any object
163. See id. at 137; see also Customs Directive 5230-15, Cust. B. & Dec.
April 18, 1991.
164. For a discussion of the impact of the Second Circuit's treatment of
McClain and the NSPA, see infra notes 193-229 and accompanying text.
165. See An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231; 19 U.S.C.
1595a(c); 18 U.S.C. 2314.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
167. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c).
168. See An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231. The question of
who made the false statements or clandestinely imported the Phiale is irrelevant,
as the seizure and forfeiture were "in rem" rather than "in personam"
proceedings, meaning that "the thing" was taken because its existence in the
United States was illegal, and the artifact is therefore contraband (i.e. the Phiale
was not taken to punish, but to rectify the situation). See id. at 232-33; An
Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 138-139; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v.
United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (holding forfeiture of contraband serves a
remedial rather than a punitive purpose as it prevents forbidden merchandise
from entering the United States).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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brought into this country in contravention of the foreign
declaration of ownership. 69 The district court first acknowledged
that Italy's Law of June 1, 1939, No. 1089, Article 44, established
ownership of the Phiale. 17 °
Based upon Haber's careful
negotiations in purchasing the Phiale (such as Haber's insistence
on a clause allowing for a full refund if the Phiale was taken by a
country or governmental agency), and his indirect route to obtain
the Phiale, the court drew "an adverse inference against Haber that
17
he knew the Phiale was stolen at the time he imported it.' '
Therefore, the district court found that the government had shown
probable cause to believe Haber knew the Phiale was stolen when
he crossed the United States border, a clear violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314, the NSPA 7 2 The district court allowed the Government's
summary judgment motion under both the Customs statute and the
NSPA.
3. The Second CircuitIlluminates McClain
The Second Circuit's decision not to consider Italian concepts of
property under the NSPA is not a refusal to apply the NSPA in
cases of civil forfeiture. To argue otherwise would be to ignore the
court's analysis of three sources authorizing such forfeiture: (1)
Customs Directive 5230-15; (2) the NSPA; and (3) McClain. The
Second Circuit interweaves these sources to explain that naming
Italy as the country of origin was relevant to the seizure of the
Phiale. Steinhardt argued that listing Switzerland as the country of
origin was irrelevant to importing the Phiale. The court disagreed,
explaining that whether a misstatement is material is relevant at
many stages in the importation process, from considering potential
violations of import law to the manner in which the object is
processed.'73 The court explained that the Customs Directive in
fact requires Customs officials to look at the country of origin and
169. See supra Section II and accompanying text.
170. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 991 F. Supp. at 231-32.
171. Id. at 232.
172. See id.
SeeCommons@DePaul,
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determine whether that country could potentially make a claim of
ownership, and, if so, Customs should seize the object. Hence, the
object's true origin is obviously material to a Customs official's
determination. 74
From a Customs perspective, country of origin is always a
significant importation issue for many legal and law enforcement
reasons. In international trade, an item's country of origin can
affect the merchandise's dutiable status. One example is the
Generalized System of Preferences, where certain countries that
have been given special status do not pay duty on their imports.
Customs inspectors must know the true country of origin in order
to apply appropriate tariffs for merchandise, depending on the
nature of the product and its origin.'75 Tariffs, quotas, and other
trade restrictions are also applied on the basis of whether a country
is a party to an international trade agreement or treaty (such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement "NAFTA" or the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization
"GATT/WTO").
Drug enforcement depends on Customs'
attention to everything that enters the United States, whether via
air, sea, or land. Antidumping orders require careful consideration
of country of origin as well. As one can see, country of origin tells
the Customs inspectors a great deal about imported merchandise,
and, in paying attention to such information, Customs is
continuously fulfilling their obligation to patrol our nation's
borders.
Customs Directive 5230-15, which advises Customs officials:
(1) to decide whether an object is subject to foreign cultural
property law; and (2) if an object is subject to such a law to seize
the property under the NSPA, emphasizes yet another reason why
country of origin information is important.'76 With respect to this
174. See id. at 137.
175. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.171-10.179 (1999) (affording duty free status to
qualifying countries (known as Beneficiary Developing Countries or "BDCs")).
For more information, see the Trade Act of 1974 as amended. 19 U.S.C. §§
2462(a)(1), 2463(a) (1999).
176. See Customs Directive 5230-15, Cust. B. & Dec. (Apr. 18, 1991)
[hereinafter Directive]. Included in the Directive are the Pre-Columbian
Monumental and Architectural Sculpture and Murals Statute, 19 U.S.C. §§
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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particular directive, the country of origin puts Customs officers on
notice as to which cultural property law is most appropriate given
an object's origin. A country with a cultural property law, such as
Italy, will be scrutinized in a different manner than an object
coming from Switzerland, a country with no such patrimony law.
When an item enters the United States from Switzerland or a
country with similar laws, the Customs inspector does not consider
an NSPA violation; rather, the inspector knows to be cognizant of
the potential for violations of other laws, such as the Cultural
Property Implementation Act.'77
In response to Steinhardt's argument that the Directive did not
apply to the Phiale, the court indicated that the Directive is the
basis upon which to justify seizing cultural property under the
NSPA.178 Relying on the Directive, the Second Circuit pointed out
that "[a]n item's country of origin is clearly relevant to [the]
inquiry [of which law to apply].' ' 179 The Directive outlines a
number of public laws that carve out Customs' responsibility in
this area, including the NSPA and the CPIA.8 ° Furthermore,
according to the Second Circuit and the Directive, such authority
under the NSPA is derivedfrom McClain L '
The Second Circuit interpreted the Directive as providing "a
basis for seizing cultural property under the NSPA in the seizure
provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)."'' 2 In fact, the intended
purpose of the Directive is "[t]o clarify the procedures for the
detention and/or seizure of cultural property."' 83 This particular
Directive provides background on the treatment of cultural
property and Customs' current policies with respect to cultural
2091-2095 (1999); the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613(1999); the NSPA and McClain.
177. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 [hereinafter CPIA]. For further discussion
of the differences between the NSPA and the CPIA, see infra Section IV.A and
accompanying notes.
178. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 137.
179. Id.
180. See Directive 5230-15, supra note 176.
181. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 137.
182. Id.
Directive,
supra note 176,2016
at 1.
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property and the laws of foreign nations. 84 Thus, the Second
Circuit applied the information in the Directive to explain that the
country of origin is material to the importation of antiquities.18
To further strengthen the point that the Directive is a link
between seizure and the NSPA, the Second Circuit explained that
Customs' seizure of the Phiale was authorized in the NSPA by
virtue of McClain.86 The Second Circuit interpreted the Directive
as saying, "a reasonable customs official would certainly consider
the fact that McClain supports a colorable claim to seize the Phiale
as having possibly been exported in violation of Italian patrimony
laws."' 87 The Second Circuit further noted that the Directive
explicitly mentions the McClain line of cases, "and informs
officials that if they are unsure of the status of a nation's patrimony
laws, they should notify the Office of Enforcement." '
This
instruction clarifies the point that in this case, "[k]nowing that the
Phaile was from Italy would, therefore, be of critical
importance."'8 9 This statement links materiality to McClain and
the NSPA because disclosure of the true country of origin is
critical to Customs' conduct. The Second Circuit goes even
further to associate materiality and the NSPA by stating, "the test
of materiality applies not only to the [Customs inspector's]
decision to admit an item but also to decisions as to ... expediting
importation."' 90 By linking the Customs authority in dealing with
importation to the country of origin, the Second Circuit alerted
dealers and foreign nations that the mere existence of a cultural
property law sensitizes Customs to a potential NSPA violation.
Whether that potential violation will ultimately be cause for the
return of the property depends on the nature of the claiming
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See An Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d at 137.
187. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the Customs Directive is proper,
"[r]egardless of whether McClain's reasoning is ultimately followed as a proper
interpretation of the NSPA..." but goes on to support the Customs Directive,
McClain, and the NSPA. Id. at 137.
188. See id.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 136.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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country's cultural patrimony law (i.e. does it meet the three NSPA
elements of being stolen from that country's modem-day
boundaries, after the effective date of the patrimony law, in
addition to being sufficiently clear to an American?).' 9' While the
initial decision to allow importation is made by a Customs officer,
the final determination regarding seizure and/or forfeiture will be
made by a court, following the Second Circuit decision.
In An Antique Platter of Gold, the court did not have to wrestle
with the burdens of the NSPA because Haber betrayed Customs
not once, but three times, on various Customs forms. Haber, in all
his efforts to deceive, gave the government two causes of action,
under two separate forfeiture statutes, and made seizure easy.
Regardless of Haber's cunning clauses in the bill of sale, the Phiale
is back in Italy, and his client is without one million dollars.'92

III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

OF THE NSPA UPHOLDS

MCCLAIN AND ITS UNDERLYING PURPOSE

A. An Antique Platter of Gold Makes Clear-- The CPIA Does
Not Overshadow the NSPA
One of the most important benefits that comes from the Second
Circuit's decision in upholding the NSPA is that the court
implicitly agrees with the Respondents and amici curiae,
Archaeological Institute of America ("AIA"), that the CPIA does
not preempt the NSPA.'93
An interesting issue raised by
Steinhardt, the Government, and the amici curiae is what impact
the 1982 adoption of Sections of the 1970 UNESCO Convention

191. See infra Section III and accompanying notes.
192. Steinhardt has already filed a petition for remission or mitigation with
the U.S. Attorney General's office for compensation due to the seizure and
forfeiture of the Phiale. This is a non-legal, private action considered by the

Attomey General. See Steinhardt Seeks $1.2 Million Refund, WALL ST. J., Mar.
3, 2000 at W12.
193. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1999) ("CPIA").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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has had on McClain and the NSPA 9 4 Congress did not intend to
preempt the NSPA with the adoption of the CPIA. The CPIA is
limited in nature. Legislative attempts to overrule McClain by
amending the NSPA have been futile, and the Second Circuit has
effectively upheld McClain. Since a government official has the
discretion to apply the most appropriate of two similar statutes, it
follows that the CPIA is a law separate and distinct from the NSPA
and in no way undercuts McClain's authority.
In urging the court to overturn or affirm the district court's
decision that the Phiale was stolen under the NSPA, Steinhardt and
amici curiae American Association of Museums ("AAM") argued
that the NSPA was preempted in 1982 when Congress adopted the
CPIA.' 95 As its title suggests, the CPIA is comprised of selected
Sections of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 9 6 In short, the CPIA

194. See UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing
the Illegal Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property,
adopted Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
195. See Appellant's Brief at 26-30, U.S. v. An Antique Platterof Gold, 184
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999). See Brief of Amicae Curiae AAM at 5-7, U.S. v. An
Antique Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).
196. The CPIA adopts only articles 7(b) and 9 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention. Article 7(b) reads:
The Parties to this Convention Undertake: to prohibit the import of
cultural property stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public
monument or similar institution in another State Party to this
Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for the States
concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining
to the inventory of that institution;
i. at the request of the State Party of origin, to take appropriate steps to
recover and return any such cultural property imported after the entry
into force of this Convention in both States concerned, provided,
however, that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an
innocent purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property.
Requests for recovery and return shall be made through diplomatic
offices. The requesting Party shall furnish, at its expense, the
documentation and other evidence necessary to establish its claim for
recovery and return. The Parties shall impose no customs duties or
other charges upon cultural property returned pursuant to this Article.
All expenses incident to the return and delivery of the cultural property
shall be borne by the requesting Party. Convention on the Means of
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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authorizes the President to enter into agreements with UNESCO
State Parties to apply import restrictions on certain archaeological
and ethnological property of that state party. 97 The CPIA also
allows the President to impose import restrictions in emergency
situations at the request of a state party when "cultural property is
being plundered from a specific area.""' In addition, the CPIA
authorizes the seizure and return of property stolen from the
inventory of a museum, religious institution, or secular public

Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property Done at Paris, 17 November 1970.
Article 9 reads:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may
call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to
this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the
necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and
imports and international commerce in the specific materials
concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take
provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable
injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State. Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property Done at Paris, 17
November 1970.
197. Section 2602(a) reads, in pertinent part:
If the President determines, after request is made to the United States...
by any state party that the cultural patrimony of the State Party is in
jeopardy from the pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials of
the State Party; that the State Party has taken measures consistent with
the Convention to protect its cultural patrimony.. .remedies less
drastic.. .are not available; and that the application of the import
restrictions set forth in Section 2606 of this title... is consistent with
the general interest of the international community. . .the President
may, subject to the provisions of this chapter.. .enter into a bilateral [or
multilateral] agreement with the State Party to apply the import
restrictions set forth in Section 2606. 19 U.S.C. § 2606.
19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1999) provides customs with the authority to refuse the
release of objects that fall under the CPIA.
Published by Digital
Commons@DePaul,
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monument located within a State Party's jurisdiction.199 Recall that
the NSPA prohibits the interstate or foreign transport of stolen
property, and is not limited to signatories of a particular treaty or
convention."'
In arguing that the CPIA does preempt the NSPA, Steinhardt
asserted that 19 U.S.C. § 2607 limits United States law honoring
foreign cultural property to only the cultural property stolen from
such an institution, rather than property owned or exported in
violation of a country's cultural property law.2" 1 The AIA and the
government's brief contend, however, that Congress wanted to
avoid preempting previous laws such as the NSPA. °2 The Customs
Directive supports such a contention, as it acknowledges the
propriety of using either the NSPA or the CPIA, whichever is most
appropriate in a given situation.0 3
The CPIA is limited in its coverage as it "only deals with
situations in which State Parties have identified specific thefts,
looting areas, or particular designated classes of materials," and not

199. 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1999); Respondent's Brief at 37.
200. See supra note 5.
201. See Appellant's Brief at 29, U.S. v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184
F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999). Section 2607 provides: No article of cultural property
documented as appertaining to the inventory of a museum or religious
institution in any State Party which is stolen from such institution after the
effective date of this chapter, or after the date of entry into force of the
Convention for the State Party, whichever is later, may be imported into the
United States." 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (1999).
202. The AIA amici curiae represented the AIA, the American
Anthropological Association ("AAA"), the United State Committee for the
International Council on Monuments and Sites ("US/ICOMOS"), the Society for
American Archaeology ("SAA"), the American Philological Association
("APA"), and the Society for Historical Archaeology ("SHA"). The AIA amici
curiae submitted a brief "to urge the Court to uphold the decision below, which
recognizes the cultural rights in historic objects of countries of origin, will aid in
efforts to discourage the looting and pillaging of archaeological sites and
resources, and work toward proper respect for United States, as well as
international, cultural heritage." Brief of Amici Curiae AIA U.S. v. An Antique
Platterof Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999).
203. Directive 5230-15, supra note 176.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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"items that are clandestinely excavated. 2 14 According to the
Government, the CPIA is not so expansive as to hinder the
enforcement of laws such as the NSPA, which prohibits "the
unlawful excavation in cultural property, particularly where no
unearthed before a foreign government knew of
such property 20was
5
existence.,
its
In addition to the limited nature of the CPIA, under general rules
of statutory construction, one's conduct can violate more than one
statute, and the Government has the choice of which statute to
apply in prosecuting an offense." 6 In support of this argument, the
Government and the AIA provided legislative history indicating
that the CPIA does not preempt State law or modify Federal or
State remedies in the cultural property realm. 20 7 The AIA pointed
out that, since the CPIA's adoption, efforts to legislatively overrule
McClain have been thwarted.0 8 In 1985, Senator Moynihan
campaigned to amend the NSPA in such a way that would
effectively overturn McClain. Moynihan's attempts were futile,
thanks in part to a persuasive argument by the AAM in favor of the
McClain decisions.2 9
In the 1985 hearings, amicus AAM, who supported Steinhardt in
the Phiale controversy, advocated the NSPA in stating that
McClain II "'removed the concerns of many in the Museum
204. Respondent's Brief at 38. See James A.R. Nafziger, Seizure and
Forfeiture of Cultural Property by the United States, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 19, 26-27 (1998) ("Unlike other parties, the United States entered a
reservation on the Convention through which it refused to enforce export
controls of foreign countries solely on the basis of illicit trafficking of cultural
property.").
205. Respondent's Brief at 39.
206. Id. at 38.
207. See id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 564, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4078, 4099) ("'[the CPIA] neither pre-empts State law in
any way, nor modifies any Federal or State remedies that may pertain to articles
to which provisions of this bill apply.").
208. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 22-25. For further information on the
futile attempts to overrule McClain in the legislature, see Jonathan S. Moore,
Enforcing Ownership Claims in the Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J., 466, 476,
n.54 (1988).
209. See Brief of Amici Curiae AIA at 23.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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community,' removing the ambiguity of the earlier decisions and
upholding 'the validity of the national declarations of ownership as
a basis for prosecution." 21 ° Furthermore, at the hearing, the AAM
argued that the CPIA was not to be the only remedy for "theft or
illegal exportation of archeological or ethnological material, but
21
one of a number of means of discouragingtheir illicit trade.""
Relying on McClain II, the Government pointed out that while
no court has had the opportunity to address the relationship
between the NSPA and the CPIA, McClain II held that neither the
UNESCO Convention (the basis on which the CPIA was
established) nor historical policy of encouraging art importation
narrowed the NSPA in such a way that it could not prohibit the
importation of cultural property which belongs to another country
based on a patrimony law.21 2 The CPIA and NSPA protect
different aspects of cultural property law. The two Acts may
overlap, but they are not mirror images of one another. The CPIA
needs the NSPA to strengthen cultural property protection, as "the
UNESCO Convention (and therefore the CPIA) has not and will
not be effective on its own in protecting works of art from illegal
trafficking." 213 In affirming the district court's decision, the
Second Circuit upheld this logic and upholds the correct policy -cultural property ought to be protected. The CPIA in no way
undercuts the progress the NSPA and McClain have made, and the
Second Circuit ensured this by affirmatively acknowledging the
NSPA's validity and the importance of the McClain doctrine.

210. Id. at 23 (quoting Testimony of the AAM before Hearings on S. 605
before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law Comm. 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG.
REC. 2611 (1985) (emphasis added)).
211. Id.
212. Respondent's Brief at 39.
213. Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property:
Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the
Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 469,

476 (1994).
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B. The NSPA is Not An Export Control In Disguise
Another key underpinning of the Second Circuit's decision is
that it reinforces the fact that there is a true distinction between
export controls and laws prohibiting the importation of stolen
property. The differentiation between illegal export and "stolen"
property has not, as many commentators have argued, been
eliminated.2 14 The United States has acknowledged the patrimony
laws of Mexico and Guatemala because they are clear, were in
effect prior to the theft in question, and because the objects were
obviously taken from the present day countries.2 ' In An Antique
Platter of Gold, the Second Circuit agreed that the United States
will honor such laws under the NSPA. An Antique Platterof Gold
is yet another example with which to disprove the contention that
the NSPA is a vehicle through which to prosecute illegal export.
The NSPA is only invoked when a claim in the United States, for
return of an object to its country of origin, is based on a property
interest, not illegal export. Recall, in contrast, that foreign export
laws, because they are regulatory in nature, are not enforceable in
the United States." 6 As McClain distinguished, export restrictions
are regulatory-not possessory-in nature.
As the Government explained, the McClain I court determined
that applying Mexico's cultural property law was not, as the
defendants in McClain argued, improper enforcement of an export
ban." 7 In addressing the issue, the Fifth Circuit explained:

214. See Monique Olivier, The Unidroit Convention: Attempting to Regulate

the InternationalTrade and Trafficking of CulturalProperty,26 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REv. 627, 648 (1996); Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the InternationalTrade
In Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 275, 346-54 (1982).
215. See U.S. v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d. 1154 (9'1 Cir. 1974) and U.S. v.
McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5" Cir. 1977), 593 F.2d 658 (511 Cir. 1979).
216. See Alexandre A. Montagu, Recent Cases on the Recovery of Stolen Art
- the Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith Purchasers Continues, 18
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75, 94-95 (1993).
217.
Respondent's
Brief at 28.2016
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The question posed, then, is not whether the federal
government will enforce a foreign nation's export
law, or whether property brought into this country
in violation of another country's exportation law is
stolen property. The question is whether the NSPA
covers property of a very special kind - purportedly
government owned, yet potentially capable of being
privately possessed when acquired by purchase or
discovery.218
Thus, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the NSPA is not an
export control, nor is it a misuse of investigatory power by
Customs.
"Illegal export is not a crime under the NSPA or any other U.S.
law," 9 and the act of illegal export-alone-does not give rise to
such a claim in United States courts. In fact, the United States
adheres to the general rule that illegal export does not
automatically constitute theft. Illegal export is not subject to legal
action in the United States solely because of the act of illegal
export from another country.2 ° This can best be understood under
the facts of McClain. In McClain, the defendants were ultimately
not held liable for the substantive count of the NSPA violation
because of the discrepancy in the effective date of Mexican law.
Had the Mexican law clearly been in effect prior to the defendants'
activities, they would have been guilty of criminal theft. However,
because Mexican cultural property law did not clearly proclaim
ownership until 1972, the court faced a difficult task in
determining whether the defendants' conduct occurred before or
after the law was enacted. Had the defendants only brought the
pre-Columbian artifacts into the United States prior to 1972, their
looting would only have risen to the level of illegal export, because
prior to the Mexican law taking effect, the United States had no
218. McClain 1,545 F.2d at 996.
219. Brian Bengs, Dead on Arrival? A Comparison of the UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and U.S. Property
Law, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503, 522 (1996).
220. See id. at 526-27.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/6
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power to seek action against the McClain defendants. However, in
McClain, the court was able to uphold the conspiracy count as the
defendants' activities continued past 1972, and evidence
sufficiently showed the defendants were aware that their activities
constituted illegal conduct, and continued looting the artifacts.
Since McClain, many commentators have noted that McClain
and the NSPA "abrogate" or "erode" the distinction between
illegally exported material and stolen property.22 ' The Second
Circuit disproves such contentions. Illegal export can mean a
number of things that have nothing to do with taking a Mayan stele
or a Greek-Sicilian platter. Illegal export can occur simply by
removing an item from a nation without notifying that nation (i.e.
lying on a duty free form). In the case of a country asserting a
cultural proprietary interest over an object, taking the object
constitutes theft, and this is a violation of the NSPA. In An Antique
Platter of Gold, the misstatement on the customs form
compounded the problem by preventing Customs from realizing
that there may have been an NSPA issue involved in the
importation of the Phiale. The Second Circuit identified just such
a mistake when Haber lied on the Customs form by linking
materiality and McClain in order to uphold the Phiale's return to
Italy.
Illegal export and stolen property are distinct ideas. When a
foreign country enacts legislation clearly stating that cultural
objects found in that country are not to be removed, as they are the
property of that country, they are asserting ownership, not merely
protecting, say, the widget industry from losing out on an unpaid
tariff or facilitating dumping. Under the NSPA, the United States
has agreed to honor these cultural protections, not in the hopes of
avoiding a WTO or NAFTA dispute, but rather out of respect for a
nation's interest in its history. Through careful analysis, the
Second Circuit facilitates such respect.

221. See Bator, supra note 214, at 346-50; Waterman, supranote 26, at 515Published16.
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B. Why Apply the Customs Statutes?
Because the Second Circuit ultimately upheld McClain and the
NSPA, why did the court first determine that the seizure of the
Phiale could be upheld under 18 U.S.C. §§ 542 and 545? This
occurred for a number of reasons. As cases such as Johnson,
Republic of Turkey and Republic of Croatia indicate that foreign
law is sometimes simply insufficient to justify seizure under the
NSPA.22 Contrary to what many commentators seem to imply,
burdens under the NSPA are not easily met.22 3 Thus, the Second
Circuit took what may appear at first glance to be the easy route.
In fact, the Second Circuit wrote a sound legal opinion, allowing
Italy to retrieve the Phiale in spite of the difficult evidentiary
standards of the NSPA.2 24

In order to warrant forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 545, the
government need only show probable cause.225 In lying on the
Customs form, Haber made the case much easier for the
government to prove under 18 U.S.C. §§ 542 and 545. From a
burden of proof standpoint, "[t]he seizure was made legally
simple... because the dealer who sold the Phiale to Steinhardt
falsified the import documents, misrepresenting both the Phiale's
country of origin and its value., 226 As one will recall, in contrast to
the Customs statutes, the NSPA requires that the government or
foreign country prove that the object was taken from a country
with a cultural property law, that the object was taken after the
patrimony law took effect, and that the law is sufficiently clear in
222. Government of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F.Supp. 810 (C.D. Calif. 1989);
Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass.
1994); Republic of Croatia v. The Trustee of the Marquess of Northampton
1987 Settlement, 610 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1t Dept. 1994).
223. See Bator, supra note 214, at 346-50.
224. The Phiale was safely retumed to the Italian government on February
11, 2000. See Archaeology, <www.archaeology.org/online/news/phiale/html>.
Visited on numerous occassions between January, 2000 and publication.
225. For a Review of 19 U.S.C. 545 and 19 U.S.C. 542, see supra notes 118
and 128 and accompanying text.
226.
Marilyn Henry, JERUSALEM POsT, Feb. 13, 2000 available at
<http://www.jpost.co.il/Editions/2000/02/13/News/News.2590.html>.
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establishing its ownership of cultural patrimony. These factors
must be met in addition to the general NSPA standard that an
individual must knowingly transport or facilitate the transport of
merchandise in foreign or interstate commerce with a value of over
$5,000.227 Even if the NSPA is not as specific as the CPIA,
countries still have to meet "heavy legal and factual burdens,"
which are only alleviated by evidence of geographic origin,
eyewitness testimony, defendant admissions and other evidentiary
22 8

proof.

The Second Circuit declined to consider the Italian patrimony
laws with little explanation beyond the decision to grant the
government's motion for summary judgment based on the Customs
statutes. Yet the court goes on to discuss the NSPA. One
possibility as to why the court did not entertain Italian law under
the NSPA was because the court would not have felt comfortable
making a determination on foreign law prior to trial despite the fact
that the judge, not the jury, is to decide questions of foreign law.229
Another possibility is that, after review of Italian law, the court
was afraid the law would not stand up to the NSPA's tough
standard. In any event, the court circumscribed analysis of Italian
law but ultimately upheld the NSPA and McClain.
IV. IMPACT:
THE SECOND CIRCUIT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR CONTINUED
APPRECIATION OF FOREIGN CULTURAL PATRIMONY LAWS

As Lawrence M. Kaye has explained, "the success achieved by
foreign claimants in a number of cultural property cases in the
United States should have a deterrent effect on the illicit trade in
23
cultural property.""
The Second Circuit is in line with this
227.
Recall McClain and its progeny.
See supra Section II and
accompanying notes.
228. See Kaye, supra note 86, at 12-16; Johnson, 720 F.Supp. at 812.
229. See, supra note 61, U.S. v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658, 669 (51, Cir. 1999).
230. Lawrence M. Kaye, The Future of the Past: Recovering Cultural
Property,4 CARDOZO J.INT'L & COMP. L. 23, 39 (1996).
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observation. The decision in An Antique Platterof Gold is positive
for Italy, as the Phiale has been returned to Italy, regardless of
which seizure provision of the United States Code facilitated the
return. An Antique Platter of Gold will have a positive impact on
other countries with cultural patrimony laws as well. The decision
signals yet another Circuit's acceptance of the NSPA, and
foreshadows success for countries who can meet the burdens
imposed by the McClain line of cases. In fact, Kaye has cited
examples of such effect, including an action brought under the
CPIA.231 Therefore, as these laws work together, the impact on the
protection and preservation of cultural property, and the
cooperation between nations with respect to cultural property, will
ideally only increase.
Many commentators have argued, and will continue to argue,
that laws like the NSPA, particularly those post-An Antique Platter
of Gold, leave American art collectors without a fair playing field
in the antiquities market, as artifacts often go to Europe because art
poor countries in Europe do not have extensive cultural property
protection laws.232 The response to this is two-fold. First, when
objects that should not have left their country of origin in the first
place are making their way to Europe instead of the United States,
Americans are no longer contributing to an illicit trade. Second,
the United States can set an example for other countries by
enforcing laws that discourage such trade. United States laws are
often referred to when other nations are developing policy and
legislation, and have a great deal of impact on multilateral
agreements. "[T]he participation or non-participation of the United
States in any international effort to control the cultural property
'
trade is ultimately determinative of its success or failure."233
By
having clear, effective laws such as the NSPA, the United States,
particularly after the Second Circuit's decision, allows the

231. See Kaye, supra note 86, at 16.
232. See Waterman, supra note 26, at 534.
233. See Bengs, supra note 219, at 516.
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American courts to set an example for others and also exemplifies
a reasonable manner with which to facilitate such recognition.234
The Second Circuit, instead of contributing to the vast amount of
illicit art dealing, treats other countries' property laws in the same
manner which the Untied States treats its own patrimony. 5
Making antiquities an "exploitable natural resource" does nothing
to ensure the safety of the objects, nor enrich the country of
origin's cultural heritage.2 36 "Mining" artifacts as if they were a
natural resource like oil or aluminum may provide the
impoverished, who are now unwitting assistants in the illicit trade,
with a "legitimate" income (meaning they will no longer be paid in
cash), yet it is doubtful that their pay will increase by any
significant amount.

234. Since the United States accepted the 1970 UNESCO Convention,
Australia, China, and Colombia, among other countries, also accepted the
Convention. In addition, Spain and France ratified the UNESCO Convention
following U.S. acceptance. See Website for the United Nations Educational,
Scientific,
and
Cultural
Organiztions.
<www.unesco.org/
culture/laws/1970/htnleng/page3.htm>. In addition, many nations follow
American legal doctrine in other areas, such as the Constitution. Visited March
5, 2000. See Ileana Gomez, Declaring Unconstitutional a Constitutional
Amendment: The Argentine Judiciary Forges Ahead, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 93, 95-96 (1993) (Argentinian Constitution follows the United States
Constitution in many respects); Ugo Mattei, The New Ethiopian Constitution:
1st Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the Reception of Western Institutions,
available at <http://www.gelso.unitn.it/card-adm/Review/Constitutional>.
Visited March 5, 2000. The impact of American Constitutional Rhetoric on the
Ethiopian Constitution is "staggering, the United States Constitution has always
been one of the most influential in the world." Id. For example, American
concepts of "life, liberty, and property," are adopted as "life, liberty, and the
security of the person." Id.
235. See, e.g., The Archaeolgoical Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16
U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm; The Native American Graves Repatriation Act, 25
U.S.C. § 3001-3013. For an examination of cultural property protection in the
United States, see Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The
Protection of Cultural Property in the United States, 73 B.U. L. REv. 559
(1995).
236. See Waterman, supra note 26, at 535-36; John H. Merryman & Albert
E. Elsen, Hot Art: A Reexamination of the Illegal International Trade in
Objects,
J. ARTS MGMT2016
& L. 5, 8 (1982).
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The black market in cultural property thrives because the
clandestine trade is overlooked rather than regulated in many
nations. Prevention of the illegal purchase of cultural property
would result in a loss of trade for the looters, and therefore sites go
untrammeled. Clear laws, such as the NSPA, along with the
precedent of protecting cultural property, encourage the study of
unharmed sites. Once sites have been adequately studied in their
original state, the artifacts will be made available for public use.
This is better than the current practice of some who obtain objects
clandestinely and share them only with dinner guests and potential
purchasers. This, in turn, will result in greater access to cultural art
for those who otherwise do not have the opportunity to view such
beauty or obtain such information. If archaeologists have had an
opportunity to understand the works within their original
environment first, we will better understand what these artifacts
signify and why they are important, as participants in the common
human culture. "[A]rtifacts, no matter how beautiful, cannot tell a
story unless they are properly excavated."2'37 The Second Circuit
contributes to such a tale.
V.

CONCLUSION

In An Antique Platter of Gold, the Second Circuit carefully
analyzed the McClain line of cases in light of relevant United
States legal doctrine, statutory enactments, and departmental
rulings. In so doing, the court emphasized the importance of
cultural property protection, and reinforced the fact that the United
States will honor cultural patrimony laws out of respect for other
nations and appreciation of the human condition, both now and
before. Without the benefit of understanding the culture of those
who have come before us, we lose a valuable tool that enables us to
make proper choices about how to handle what lies ahead. Hazel
eyes are, like golden platters, merely an aesthetic wonder when

237. See Lenzner, supra note 213, at 486 n.84 (quoting George Lardner, Jr.,
The Pillagingof GlobalArt Treasures,WASH. POST, May 18, 1977, at Al).
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they are left without the context of, and appreciation for, who
before you valued them as well.
Ann Brickley
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